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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

NFAC 4480-80/1
25 June 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: [REDACTED]
Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation
Intelligence

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SUBJECT: Warning Report--Nuclear Proliferation [REDACTED]

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1. Action Requested: None; for your information only. [REDACTED]

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2. Background: The Interagency Intelligence Working Group on Nuclear Proliferation met on 18 June 1980 to discuss warning matters. Attached is my report based in large part on the discussions that took place. [REDACTED]

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The Pakistan-Iraq-Israel situation continues to be of great concern. The Israelis are taking a very pessimistic, worst case view of nuclear developments in the Arab/Muslim world. They are certainly rethinking their nuclear security policy [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Attachment:
Warning Report

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Warning Report: Nuclear Proliferation*

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Pakistan. Recent reports, via the Soviet news agency TASS, that China has promised to secretly explode a Pakistani nuclear device to "check its effectiveness" cannot be substantiated, although some degree of Chinese-Pakistani cooperation in nuclear weapons development cannot be ruled out entirely. A key consideration for any Pakistani nuclear test continues to be whether or not Pakistan has acquired sufficient fissile material to fabricate a nuclear explosive device.

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Argentina. In turning to the USSR for possible supply of enriched uranium for its research reactors, Argentina has opened the possibility of a complete break-off in nuclear relations with the US. While we do not think this is likely at the moment, an

*This memorandum is produced periodically by the Special Assistant to the DD/NFA for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously, many of these developments will not occur in the time frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.

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inclination to turn away from the US is indicated by a recent public statement by Castro Madera (President of the National Atomic Energy Commission)--the first by an Argentine official in over a year--that peaceful nuclear explosions might become a necessity and are permitted under the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Also, the Argentines reportedly were particularly upset by the US decision to export enriched uranium to India. Some Argentine nuclear officials were reported to have characterized the decision as proof that US nonproliferation policy is not consistent but expedient. [REDACTED]

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NPT Review Conference. It is conceivable that contentious issues between the nuclear weapons states and the non-aligned states could cause the conference (scheduled to take place in Geneva, 11 August - 5 September 1980) to break up without an agreed final declaration of results and a consequent weakening of the NPT regime. If this happens, withdrawals from the treaty could follow, although there is no information that any state that is a party to the treaty is considering such action. An area of prospective sharp division is the perceived lack of progress by nuclear weapons states on strategic arms control issues. Specific actions that could be taken by the non-aligned states at the conference will probably be the subject of discussions at their meeting in Buenos Aires beginning later this month. At a minimum, US nonproliferation policies are likely to be subjected to harsh criticism; and the decision to ship nuclear fuel to India--a non-NPT party--could be held up as an example of US inconsistency. This latter issue is a two-edged sword, however, since past delays in shipment of the fuel have been held up by some as an example of the unreliability of the US as a nuclear supplier. [REDACTED]

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